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The privilege against self-incrimination registers an impor-
tant advance in the development of our liberty—one of the 
great landmarks in man’s struggle to make himself civilized.  
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble 
aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of 
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or con-
tempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an in-
quisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-
incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treat-
ment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair 
state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave 
the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing 
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the 
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individual to shoulder the entire load; our respect for the in-
violability of the human personality and of the right of each 
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private 
life; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our reali-
zation that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the 
guilty, is often a protection to the innocent.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment and privilege against self-incrimination as 
recognized today have their origins in the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights of 1776.2  Originally drafted by George Mason, the Declara-
tion represented an enumeration of the inherent natural rights of all 
men.3  Included in this enumeration was the right that during “all 
capital or criminal prosecutions,” a man has a right not to be “com-
pelled to give evidence against himself.”4  The Virginia constitu-
tional right, enumerated in Section 8 of the Declaration, against self-
incrimination 
applied to all stages of all equity and common-law proceed-
ings and to all witnesses as well as to the parties.  It could be 
invoked by a criminal suspect at his preliminary examination 
before a justice of the peace; by a person testifying at a grand 
jury investigation into crime; by anyone giving evidence in a 
suit between private parties; and, above all perhaps, by the 
subject of an inquisitorial proceeding before any governmen-
tal or nonjudicial tribunal, such as a legislative committee or 
the governor and council, seeking to discover criminal culpa-
  
 1. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), overruled by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 
(1998). 
 2. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 409–10 (Macmillan 
Publ’g Co. 1986) (1968) (referencing Section 8 of the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights). 
 3. Id. at 407–08. 
 4. Id. at 405–06. 
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bility.  If one’s disclosures could make him vulnerable to le-
gal peril, he could invoke his right to silence.5 
The importance of Section 8 proved to be great, and the section 
quickly became the model for other states and the Bill of Rights.6  
Couched in the original text of Section 8 were defendants’ rights 
relating to their ability to confront accusers and witnesses, to call 
evidence in their favor, to have a speedy trial in front of an impartial 
jury, and not to be compelled to give evidence against themselves.7  
In working to draft and pass the Bill of Rights, the Senate “clustered 
together the procedural rights of the criminally accused after indict-
ment” into what is now known as the Sixth Amendment.8  The right 
against self-incrimination was deliberately separated from the other 
rights contained in Section 8 and was left to stand alone as the Fifth 
Amendment.9  “That the self-incrimination clause did not fall into 
the Sixth Amendment indicated that the Senate, like the House, did 
not intend to follow the implication of Virginia’s Section 8, the orig-
inal model, that the right not to give evidence against oneself applied 
merely to the defendant on trial.”10  Rather, the right was intended to 
be afforded to defendants and witnesses at “any phase of the pro-
ceedings.”11 
Despite arguments to the contrary, the Supreme Court has been 
clear that there are multiple phases to a “criminal case.”12  Most ap-
plicable here is its reiteration that criminal sentencing shall be con-
sidered part of the “criminal case” as described in the Fifth Amend-
  
 5. Id. at 406 (emphasis added). 
 6. Id. at 409–10 (stating that New Hampshire in 1784 was one of the states to 
adopt a similar constitutional provision as Section 8). 
 7. Id. at 405–06. 
 8. LEVY, supra note 2, at 427. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327 (1999) (stating that sentenc-
ing is included in a “criminal case” under the Fifth Amendment); Jan Martin 
Rybnicek, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t?: The Absence of a Constitu-
tional Protection Prohibiting the Admission of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence, 
19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 405, 406–07 (2009) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966)) (stating that Fifth Amendment protections apply during 
pretrial police interrogations). 
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ment, and that the privilege against self-incrimination should apply 
outside of the trial phase.13  This note will explore the current state 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, particularly in regard to 
whether it works to bar negative inferences from being drawn from a 
defendant’s silence during sentencing in order to determine his re-
morse for the crime of which he has been convicted.  I will focus 
primarily on the issue in the context of the recent New Hampshire 
case State v. Burgess.14  In that case, the court recognized the appli-
cation of the privilege at sentencing, but nonetheless carved out a 
unique exception which made negative inferences permissible at 
sentencing when the defendant has admitted to the act underlying the 
charged crime but relied on some defense or legal justification to 
undermine his culpability.15  This note will highlight the unworkabil-
ity of this exception and demonstrate how it conflicts with common 
law precedent. 
II. STATE V. BURGESS 
On October 25 through 27, 2004, John Burgess appeared in Mer-
rimack County Superior Court for several judicial proceedings.16  To 
limit his ability to walk normally, the sheriff’s department placed a 
leg brace on Burgess while he was in the holding cell in the base-
ment of the courthouse.17  The brace utilized a “locking mechanism,” 
which prevented the defendant from bending his knee, thus requiring 
him to walk “stiff-legged.”18  To allow Burgess to sit normally, the 
brace had a lever that disabled the lock.19 
  
 13. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 325 (stating its repeated rejection of the argument 
that “incrimination is complete once guilt has been adjudicated”).  The Court went 
on to hold that the privilege against self-incrimination will only cease to apply 
once “the sentence has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has become 
final.”  Id. at 326.  But see McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (articulating an 
exception to the privilege); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 
287–88 (1998) (no Fifth Amendment protections in clemency proceedings). 
 14. 943 A.2d 727 (N.H. 2008). 
 15. Id. at 737–38. 
 16. Id. at 728. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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On October 27, 2004, Burgess was ordered to return to his hold-
ing cell following a hearing at the Merrimack County courthouse.20  
Deputy Sheriff Wayne Robie later testified that as Burgess stood in 
the courtroom, Robie noticed Burgess “[l]ooking at the different en-
trances and exits and the window areas in the courtroom, seeing 
where each bailiff was positioned.”21  While Burgess was speaking 
to his attorney, another Deputy Sheriff, James Moran, instructed 
Burgess to face the front of the courtroom and place his hands be-
hind his back so that he could be handcuffed.22  Moran later testified 
that as he began to handcuff Burgess, Burgess “turned toward the 
right and bolted towards the doors.”23  Multiple deputy sheriffs 
yelled for him to stop.24  As he reached the exit, Burgess ran into 
Deputy Sheriff Robert Croteau, and both individuals were forced 
through the door.25  In the small hallway between the inner and outer 
doors to the courtroom, Croteau tackled Burgess.26  Burgess contin-
ued to resist until he was subdued by several other officers and was 
escorted back to his holding cell.27  Once Burgess was in the holding 
cell, Deputy Sheriff Dennis Crawford unlocked the leg brace and 
observed part of a shoelace, which had been cut from one of Bur-
gess’s shoes and tied around the leg strap.28  The shoelace was used 
to disable the lock, allowing Burgess to “run in a normal fashion.”29  
Following the incident, Burgess was charged with attempted es-
cape30 and possessing an implement for escape.31 
At a subsequent interview, Lieutenant Robert Krieger alleged 
that when asked how he thought he would get out of the courthouse, 
Burgess replied that “it wasn’t a very well thought out plan and 
  
 20. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 728. 
 21. Id. (alteration in original). 
 22. Id. at 728–29. 
 23. Id. at 729. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 729. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.; see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 629:1, 642:6 (2007). 
 31. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 729; see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 642:7. 
File: Lahey Final.doc Created on:  3/19/10 3:00 PM Last Printed: 3/19/10 3:00 PM 
244 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 8, No. 2 
laughed.”32  At trial, Burgess denied saying that his alleged escape 
attempt was not a well thought out plan; rather, he testified that “it 
was not [his] plan or [he] didn’t have a plan to do that.”33  Instead, 
Burgess admitted that he had cut his own shoelace with a paper clip 
that he had found on the floor.34  He also admitted that he had used 
the severed shoelace to disable the lock; however, he denied that he 
did it with the intention of escaping.35  Instead, Burgess testified that 
he had disabled the lock during all three days of the proceeding to 
prevent the leg brace from “pinching” him.36  He further testified 
that when he turned away from Deputy Moran, he was “trying to get 
out of being grabbed by a number of people” and that he was “up-
set,” “nervous,” and “[s]omewhat afraid” because he thought that “a 
number of court officers were moving very aggressively towards 
him.”37  Burgess maintained that when Deputy Moran “reached for 
his arm, he panicked a little bit and lunged toward the door.”38 
At the close of trial, the jury found Burgess guilty of attempted 
escape and possessing an implement for escape.39  Before sentenc-
ing, the defendant refused to participate in a Pre-Sentence Investiga-
tion (PSI).40  At sentencing, the State requested that Burgess receive 
the maximum sentence of ten to thirty years in prison.41  Defense 
counsel asked the judge for leniency.42  Burgess did not address the 
  
 32. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 729. 
 33. Id. (second alteration in original). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  Aside from factual references, this note does not address any constitu-
tional issues related to the defendant’s refusal to participate in a PSI.  For constitu-
tional issues relating to a PSI, see United States v. Rivera, 201 F.3d 99, 102 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (stating that the court cannot impose five-year sentence enhancement 
when the defendant exercised his right to remain silent and refused to cooperate 
prior to sentencing). 
 41. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 729.  The State’s request was based on the defendant’s 
character, his prior criminal history, the nature and circumstances of the offense, 
and the potential for deterrence and rehabilitation.  Id. 
 42. Id. 
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court during the sentencing hearing.43  In the end, the sentencing 
judge fulfilled the State’s request and sentenced Burgess to the 
maximum extended term sentence.44  In support of its sentence, the 
judge stated in his opinion that the defendant had “not cooperated in 
terms of the Pre-Sentence report in terms of telling any—or talking 
to me as he’s had opportunities to do about his situation.”45  Follow-
ing sentencing, Burgess moved to vacate the sentence relying on 
Mitchell v. United States46 grounds, specifically that the trial court 
violated his right against self-incrimination by considering his si-
lence at the sentencing hearing.47  He argued that the court had 
impermissibly relied on his failure to participate in the PSI and speak 
at sentencing, thus violating his state and federal constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination.48  In response, the court stated that it 
did not rely on Burgess’s silence during either PSI or sentencing in a 
manner violative of Mitchell.49  With support from several other ju-
risdictions, the court explained that that it considered the defendant’s 
silence and declination to participate in PSI  
in the context of dealing with the plea by his counsel for leni-
ency or mercy, and in assessing the degree, if at all, the de-
fendant had any rehabilitation potential, or ability to alter his 
undisputed long history of disturbing criminal activity, both 
in and out of prison, including three . . . prior convictions of 
Escape.50 
In light of the sentencing court’s statements and explanations, 
Burgess’s motion to vacate was denied.51 
On appeal, Burgess argued that the sentencing court had “vio-
lated his privilege against self-incrimination under Part I, Article 15 
  
 43. Id. at 730. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 46. 526 U.S. 314 (1999). 
 47. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 730. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 730–31. 
 51. Id. at 731. 
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of the New Hampshire Constitution52 by using his silence as a factor 
in sentencing.”53  The State countered this by explaining that it had 
only used the defendant’s silence to determine his ability for reha-
bilitation.54  In its opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reit-
erated that while a sentencing judge has “broad discretion to choose 
the sources and types of evidence upon which to rely in imposing 
sentence, that discretion is not unlimited.”55  In a question of first 
impression, the court rejected the “distinction between using a de-
fendant’s silence to infer a failure to express remorse and using it to 
punish a defendant for refusing to admit guilt.” 56  Citing Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary and Random House Dictionary 
of the English Language, the court defined “remorse” as “a gnawing 
distress arising from a sense of guilt for past wrongs” or “deep and 
painful regret for wrongdoing.”57  The court then reasoned that “for a 
defendant to truthfully express remorse, he must to some degree ac-
knowledge wrongdoing or guilt.”58  Accordingly, “[a] defendant . . . 
can hardly be expected to be remorseful for something he contends 
that he did not do.”59  Considering those principles, the court found 
no practical distinction or reason to differentiate between a defen-
  
 52. “No subject shall be . . . compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against 
himself.”  N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15.  Further, “[t]he privilege against self-
incrimination found in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is compa-
rable in scope to the privilege afforded to the defendant under Part I, Article 15.”  
Burgess, 943 A.2d at 731 (citing Knowles v. Warden, 666 A.2d 972, 976 (N.H. 
1995)).  Accordingly, references to the Fifth Amendment apply interchangeably to 
Part I, Article 15. 
 53. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 731.  The defendant did not assert his federal constitu-
tional rights.  Id.  In certain circumstances, “Part I, Article 15 provides greater 
protection to a defendant than does the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. at 732 (citing State 
v. Roache, 803 A.2d 572, 577 (N.H. 2002)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Lambert, 787 A.2d 175, 176 (N.H. 
2001)). 
 56. Id. at 735–36. 
 57. Id. at 736. 
 58. Id. (citing People v. Ward, 499 N.E.2d 422, 429 (Ill. 1986) (Simon, J., dis-
senting)). 
 59. Ward, 499 N.E.2d at 429 (Simon, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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dant’s failure to show remorse and a failure to admit guilt60 and rec-
ognized that in either case the defendant “must admit wrongdoing 
and jeopardize his post-trial remedies, testify falsely and risk a per-
jury conviction, or remain silent and risk obtaining a greater sen-
tence.”61 
The question of first impression addressed by the court in Bur-
gess stems from an issue left open by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Mitchell.62  It is well settled that a defendant cannot be compelled to 
testify against himself or be forced to make incriminating statements 
against himself.63  The Fifth Amendment (and state constitutional 
equivalents) offers protection against this type of self-
incrimination.64  However, questions arise as to the extent of such 
protections, particularly whether a sentencing judge may read into a 
defendant’s silence during the process to assess his remorse or reha-
bilitation capacity and thus adjust the sentence accordingly. 
III. HISTORY 
In order to understand and fully assess the application of self-
incrimination protection in criminal sentencing, it is necessary to 
appreciate the relevant case law that shapes the privilege we recog-
nize today.  Prior to 1965, the Court assumed arguendo that, while 
any defendant was free to invoke the rights provided by the Fifth 
Amendment at trial, the decision to remain silent was not completely 
free from negative consequence for the defendant.65  Instead, those 
  
 60. Burgess, 493 A.2d at 736 (citing People v. Wesley, 411 N.W.2d 159, 165, 
166 & n.2 (Mich. 1987) (Brickley, J., concurring)). 
 61. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983)). 
 62. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999). 
 63. Id. at 327. 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15. 
 65. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (holding that even if such 
conduct violated the Fifth Amendment, no constitutional analysis would be neces-
sary as the Fifth Amendment did not bind the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).  In Twining, 
the court upheld a state court’s jury instruction: 
[The defendant] has sat here and heard that testimony and not denied it—
nobody could misunderstand the import of that testimony, it was a direct 
accusation made against him of his guilt—if you believe that testimony 
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who elected to exercise their constitutional right subjected them-
selves to the instructions and comments of judges and prosecutors 
urging jurors to draw “unfavorable inference[s]” against them for 
their failure to testify where it was within their power to deny the 
evidence presented to incriminate them.66  Drawing these inferences 
from defendants’ silence remained permissible for nearly sixty years.  
However, in 1965, in Griffin v. California, the Court rejected this 
practice and held that it was a violation of a defendant’s constitu-
tional rights for such unfavorable inferences to be drawn.67  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Douglas proclaimed that the Fifth Amend-
ment must be taken in its literal sense, and therefore it “[forbade] 
either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or in-
structions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.”68  The 
Court recognized such comments and instructions as court-imposed 
penalties against those who opted to exercise a constitutional privi-
lege.69  Accordingly, Griffin established that in criminal trials, no 
negative inference could be drawn from a defendant’s failure to tes-
tify.70 
Following Griffin, courts were still left to grapple with the extent 
of protection offered by the Fifth Amendment.  While Griffin held 
that negative inferences could not be drawn from a defendant’s si-
lence during the guilt phase of a trial, the decision itself was silent as 
to whether this protection extended into other phases, specifically 
sentencing proceedings.71  Some viewed the Fifth Amendment and 
Griffin as only intending to offer protection when determining guilt, 
and that once a case had been adjudicated, the risk of self-
  
beyond a reasonable doubt, [he] is guilty.  And yet he has sat here and not 
gone upon the stand to deny it.  He was not called upon to go upon the 
stand and deny it, but he did not go upon the stand and deny it, and it is 
for you to take that into consideration. 
Id. at 82. 
 66. Id. at 90. 
 67. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).  This holding was built upon an earlier holding in 
Malloy, which stated that the Fifth Amendment applied to the State through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  378 U.S. at 8. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 614. 
 70. Id. at 614–15. 
 71. See id. 
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incrimination ceased.72  Under this view, the privilege had no rele-
vance outside of the determination of guilt or innocence, and in other 
phases, particularly in sentencing, judges and prosecutors were free 
to encourage jurors to extrapolate inferences from a defendant’s fail-
ure to testify or comment in his own defense.73 
However, sixteen years later, the Court in Estelle v. Smith put 
this view to rest and rejected the compartmentalized interpretation of 
the Fifth Amendment, stating that it saw “no basis to distinguish be-
tween the guilt and penalty phases of [a] capital murder trial so far as 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned.”74  
But rather than render the privilege absolutely applicable to sentenc-
ing, the Court first adopted what has been called an “exposure-based 
standard” for applying the privilege.75  Under this standard, the 
“availability of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn upon 
the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon 
the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it 
invites.”76  Specifically, the Fifth Amendment “privilege would ap-
ply at trial and at capital sentencing—when a defendant’s ‘exposure’ 
[wa]s at its highest—but not necessarily at noncapital sentencing.”77  
The Court reasoned that when a defendant faced the grave conse-
quence of the death penalty at sentencing, “the State [wa]s not re-
lieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guar-
antees.”78 
While by its own words Estelle was limited to only capital cases, 
the Court later erased its own distinction between capital and non-
  
 72. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 462–63. 
 75. David B. Lat, Case Note, Sentencing and the Fifth Amendment, 107 YALE 
L.J. 2673, 2675 (1998). 
 76. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1, 49 (1967)). 
 77. Lat, supra note 75, at 2675; see Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469 n.13 (“Of course, we 
do not hold that the same Fifth Amendment concerns are necessarily presented by 
all types of interviews and examinations that might be ordered or relied upon to 
inform a sentencing determination.”). 
 78. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 463 (citing Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979)). 
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capital cases in Mitchell.79  Offering all criminal defendants the same 
protections previously only afforded to those facing capital punish-
ment, the Court stated that the “Fifth Amendment by its [own] terms 
prevents a person from being ‘compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.’”80  Accordingly, following Mitchell, all 
criminal defendants were entitled to the protections of the privilege 
during both the guilt and penalty phases of a trial.  The only remain-
ing limitation imposed on the application of the privilege was that 
the defendant must face a continuing risk of incrimination or adverse 
consequence.81  In regard to this limitation, the Court specifically 
recognized that “[w]here the sentence has not yet been imposed a 
defendant may have a legitimate fear of adverse consequences from 
further testimony.”82  The Court highlighted that in the sentencing 
process, “the stakes are high” and that the adverse inferences drawn 
from a defendant’s silence may result in years of added imprison-
ment.83  Often, the Court said, the Government has a “motive to de-
mand a severe sentence, so the central purpose of the privilege—to 
protect a defendant from being the unwilling instrument of his or her 
own condemnation—remains of vital importance.”84  Quoting its 
own language from Estelle, the Court reaffirmed that “[a]ny effort 
by the State to compel [the defendant] to testify against his will at 
the sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amend-
ment.”85 
In its brief in Mitchell, the Government argued that even if the 
Court chose to recognize the extension of the privilege in all crimi-
nal sentencing, exceptions to this general rule still existed; particu-
larly, that courts were entitled to draw adverse inferences with “re-
gard to factual determinations respecting the circumstances and de-
  
 79. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999) (“Estelle was a capital 
case, but we find no reason not to apply the principle to noncapital sentencing 
hearings as well.”). 
 80. Id. at 327 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 81. Id. at 326 (stating the general rule is that when the defendant can be no fur-
ther incriminated, there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 329. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981)). 
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tails of the crime.”86  The Court rejected this suggestion and declined 
to create an exception to the general rule that no adverse inference 
may be drawn from a defendant’s silence while he still faces the risk 
of self-incrimination or adverse consequence.87  The Court’s declina-
tion to create an exception for factual determinations respecting the 
circumstances and details of a crime garnered further support in Jus-
tice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.88  Despite disagreeing with the 
foundation of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that as long 
  
 86. Id. at 328; see also id. at 337–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing instances 
where the Court has stated that it is permissible to draw adverse inferences from 
silence as denials of clemency, imposition of punishment for violation of prison 
rules, and deportation).  In his dissent, Justice Scalia presents the permissibility of 
drawing adverse inference in the three above-mentioned instances as contrary to 
the general rule that no adverse interference may be drawn from a defendant’s 
silence during criminal sentencing while the risk of further incrimination or ad-
verse consequence still exists.  Id.  Such a categorization is misleading.  Specifi-
cally, the Court has recognized that “clemency proceedings are not an integral part 
of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.”  
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285 (1998) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 
387, 393 (1985)).  The Court recognized that during clemency proceedings, the 
defendant “is already under a sentence . . . determined to have been lawfully im-
posed.  If clemency is granted, he obtains a benefit; if it is denied, he is no worse 
off than he was before.”  Id.  Accordingly, clemency would be outside of the stan-
dards created in Griffin and Mitchell as the defendant’s case had been fully adjudi-
cated and as he faced no further risk of incrimination and consequence of the 
charges against him; it is outside of the Fifth Amendment “criminal proceeding.”  
Similarly, the application of the Fifth Amendment in prison settings does not offer 
the same protections as it does in free society.  McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 
(2002).  While “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination does not terminate at the 
jailhouse door . . . the fact of a valid conviction and the ensuing restrictions on 
liberty are essential to the Fifth Amendment analysis.”  Id. (citing Sandin v. Con-
ner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995)).  “[L]awful incarceration brings about the neces-
sary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified 
by the considerations underlying our penal system.”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485).  Finally, in regard to Justice Scalia’s deporta-
tion exception, while a deportation hearing has elements of a criminal proceeding, 
it is more correctly categorized as civil in nature.  Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (stating that a deportation hearing 
is “purely civil” in nature).  By is own language, the Fifth Amendment only ap-
plies to criminal proceedings. 
 87. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 329. 
 88. Id. at 337–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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as “the guilt and sentencing phases create one inseparable ‘criminal 
case,’” the Fifth Amendment privilege applied in the same way in 
both the guilt and sentencing phases of a trial.89  It follows that since 
no exception for inferences regarding details and circumstances of a 
case exists in the guilt phase, the Court correctly held that one shall 
not exist during sentencing.  To date, the Court has not recognized 
any exception to the Griffin “no negative inference” rule.90 
A.  A Split Among the Circuits 
Despite the Court’s decision in Mitchell, a distinction has devel-
oped in how courts treat a defendant’s silence during sentencing.  
While it is well-established that a court cannot punish a defendant 
for standing trial rather than pleading guilty, some courts have drawn 
a distinction between considering the refusal to admit guilt as a rea-
son to increase a sentence and viewing a defendant’s silence after 
trial “as a failure to accept responsibility or failure to express re-
morse, and thus indicat[ing] that an individual has a reduced poten-
tial for rehabilitation.”91 
These courts draw a “[d]istinction between imposing a harsh-
er sentence upon a defendant based on his or her lack of re-
morse, . . . and punishing a defendant for his or her refusal to 
admit guilt, . . . the latter being a violation, inter alia, of a 
criminal defendant’s right to due process, to remain silent 
and to appeal.”92 
In jurisdictions embracing this distinction, so long as the sen-
tencing court does not suggest or imply a sentence will be reduced if 
the defendant admits his guilt, there is no constitutional violation 
  
 89. Id. at 338. 
 90. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 453 (2000) (reiterating that 
“the Fifth Amendment’s bar on compelled self-incrimination is absolute”). 
 91. State v. Burgess, 943 A.2d 727, 733–34 (N.H. 2008) (citing United States v. 
Johnson, 903 F.2d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 92. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 734 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Meister, 
No. 30152, 2007 WL 2821981, at *15 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2007)); see also 
Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 65 F.3d 1372, 1379 (7th Cir. 1995); State v. Kamana‘o, 
82 P.3d 401, 407 (Haw. 2003); People v. Wesley, 411 N.W.2d 159, 162–63 (Mich. 
1987). 
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“when the court considers the defendant’s silence as a failure to ac-
cept responsibility or express remorse for the limited purpose of de-
termining whether rehabilitation efforts would be fruitful.”93  Other 
courts have rejected the distinction, instead choosing to enforce the 
strict Mitchell approach that no inferences may be drawn from a de-
fendant’s silence at any stage of a trial proceeding, holding that a 
“court cannot constitutionally consider [a defendant’s] lack of an 
expression of remorse as an aggravating circumstance” when he ex-
ercises his Fifth Amendment right.94  In declining to recognize the 
distinction, these jurisdictions require that, in order to be protected 
against such adverse inferences, the defendant being sentenced must 
have maintained his innocence throughout the trial.95  These courts 
hold that contrition or remorse necessarily implies guilt, and that it 
would be irrational to expect one who maintains his innocence to 
express either contrition or remorse.96  They reason that, while reha-
bilitation is an important factor to consider at sentencing, “allowing 
a court to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence at 
sentencing when he had maintained his innocence throughout the 
proceedings ‘would force upon the defendant the Hobson’s choice[,] 
which is condemned by the Fifth Amendment.’”97  Specifically, a 
defendant cannot be forced to either incriminate himself at sentenc-
ing in order to show remorse or exercise his right to remain silent 
and possibly suffer the “imposition of a greater sentence.”98  This 
view is consistent with the Court’s holding in Estelle that “[a]ny ef-
fort by the State to compel [a defendant] to testify against his will at 
the sentencing hearing clearly . . . contravene[s] the Fifth Amend-
ment.”99 
  
 93. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 734 (citing Meister, 2007 WL 2821981, at *15); see 
also Wesley, 411 N.W.2d at 163. 
 94. People v. Young, 987 P.2d 889, 894 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. 
Tinajero, 935 P.2d 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)); see also State v. Hardwick, 905 
P.2d 1384, 1391 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
 95. See State v. Shreves, 60 P.3d 991, 996 (Mont. 2002). 
 96. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 735 (quoting Hardwick, 905 P.2d at 1391); see also 
Brake v. State, 939 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Nev. 1997). 
 97. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 735 (quoting Shreves, 60 P.3d at 996–97). 
 98. Shreves, 60 P.3d at 996–97. 
 99. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981). 
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Despite the implications and the Court’s holdings in Estelle, 
Griffin, and Mitchell, the Court has not specifically addressed 
whether a sentencing court may view a defendant’s silence as de-
monstrative of his lack of remorse and increase his sentence accord-
ingly.  In his dissent in Mitchell, Justice Scalia insists that because 
the majority limited its rejection of proposed exceptions to the “no 
adverse inferences” rule to only “determining facts of the offense,” 
the majority intentionally left the door open to create other excep-
tions.100 
Today’s opinion states, in as inconspicuous a manner as pos-
sible at the very end of its analysis (one imagines that if the 
statement were delivered orally it would be spoken in a very 
low voice, and with the Court’s hand over its mouth), that its 
holding applies only to inferences drawn from silence “in de-
termining the facts of the offense.”101 
Justice Scalia opined that the majority intentionally ignored other 
potential exceptions, particularly in regard to inferring a lack of re-
morse, by sweeping the clutter under the rug and limiting the opinion 
only to determining facts of the offense.102  These criticisms are mis-
placed.  The majority opinion in Mitchell is clearly limited to deter-
minations of facts, but in “creating” this limitation, the majority did 
not ignore any presented question; it did not sweep anything under 
the rug.  In its brief, the broadest argument put forth by the govern-
ment was that a court could draw negative inferences from a defen-
dant’s silence in regard to the facts and circumstances of a case.103  
The issue of whether it was permissible to draw adverse inferences 
as to the defendant’s remorse was not presented. 
The Court has specifically addressed circumstances where, de-
spite a possible constitutional issue, it should refuse to hear and de-
cide on a particular issue.  In his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, Justice Brandeis stated that the Court 
“will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the 
  
100. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 340 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 339. 
102. Id. at 340. 
103. Brief for the United States at 31 n.18, Mitchell, 526 U.S. 314 (No. 97-7541). 
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necessity of deciding it”104 and that “[i]t is not the habit of the 
[C]ourt to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless abso-
lutely necessary to a decision of the case.”105  Additionally, “[t]he 
Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”106  Since 
Ashwander, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance has become a 
“well-settled doctrine of the Court.”107  In Mitchell, the Govern-
ment’s brief did not present any issue regarding inferring a lack of 
remorse from a defendant’s silence.  Accordingly, the Court was 
correct in not expanding its opinion and commenting on potential 
exceptions other than those presented in the Government’s brief.  
Expanding its decision beyond the facts and circumstances of the 
case at hand would have violated Ashwander and the principles of 
constitutional avoidance.108  Justice Scalia’s suggestion that, by only 
commenting on the instant case and its presented issues, the Court 
expressly intended to leave open a future exception for determining 
lack of remorse is incorrect.  While the Court’s failure to comment 
on the issue of lack of remorse preserves the issue for another day, it 
is not demonstrative of the likelihood of the Court finding such an 
exception.  As it stands, the Court has not decided the issue pre-
sented in this note.109 
B.  Where New Hampshire Stands 
In deciding State v. Burgess, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
foreclosed the idea of an exception to the “no negative inference” 
rule that would allow inferences to be drawn from a defendant’s si-
lence in regard to determining remorse or rehabilitation potential 
  
104. 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). 
105. Id. (quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)). 
106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. 
Co., 113 U.S. at 39). 
107. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 211–12 (1960). 
108. Id. at 482–83. 
109. But see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 453 (2000) (post-Mitchell 
case reiterating that “the Fifth Amendment’s bar on compelled self-incrimination 
is absolute”). 
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during criminal sentencing.110  However, unlike other courts reject-
ing this potential exception,111 the New Hampshire court created a 
strange exception to its otherwise firm prohibition on inferences 
from a defendant’s silence at sentencing.112  Unlike fellow jurisdic-
tions, the New Hampshire court weakened its holding by stating that 
“a sentencing court’s inference of a lack of remorse from a defen-
dant’s silence at sentencing does not violate the privilege against 
self-incrimination in all instances.”113  In spite of its holding that 
negative inferences at sentencing are impermissible, the court cre-
ated its own distinction and proclaimed that the determination of 
whether a defendant’s right to remain silent has been violated will be 
conducted on a case-by-case basis.114  Specifically, rather than pro-
vide each defendant who has maintained his innocence at trial with 
the same constitutional protections, the court reasoned that “where a 
defendant admits to committing the acts underlying the charged 
crime, but disputes whether he had the requisite mental state for the 
crime, or offers a legal justification for committing those acts, the 
defendant’s silence at sentencing might . . . legitimately be consid-
ered as a lack of remorse.”115  The court stated that since the defen-
dant confessed to the acts underlying both crimes—he admitted to 
cutting the lace, disabling the lock, and pulling away when the sher-
iff attempted to handcuff him—he only denied that he had the requi-
site intent to escape.116  Because the defendant theoretically could 
have expressed remorse for endangering the court personnel without 
undermining his assertion that his perceived escape attempt was 
simply his reacting to feelings of panic and anxiety, the court rea-
soned that “the defendant’s asserted lack of intent to escape would 
not have conflicted with any feelings of remorse.”117 
  
110. State v. Burgess, 943 A.2d 746, 735–36 (N.H. 2008). 
111. See, e.g., Brake v. State, 939 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Nev. 1997). 
112. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 738. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. (citing Brake, 939 P.2d at 1034 (Shearing, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
116. Id. at 739. 
117. Id.  But see id. at 735 (quoting State v. Hardwick, 905 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1995)) (stating that contrition and remorse “necessarily imply guilt” and 
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In garnering transjurisdictional support for its line of reasoning, 
the Burgess court looked to Chief Justice Shearing’s dissent in Brake 
v. Nevada.118  In Brake, the defendant was charged with first-degree 
murder.119  Throughout his trial, he maintained his innocence as to 
the crime of first-degree murder by putting on a defense that he had 
killed the victim in self-defense.120  In doing so, the defendant de-
nied that he possessed the requisite intent to commit first-degree 
murder.121  In assessing whether the trial court was correct in using 
the defendant’s silence at sentencing to determine whether the de-
fendant was remorseful, the majority considered the defendant’s 
ability to show remorse without risking self-incrimination.122  Ac-
cording to the majority, because the defendant’s theory at trial was 
that he had killed the victim in self-defense, he had “maintained his 
innocence of the crime for which he was ultimately convicted and 
was unable to express remorse and admit guilt to first degree murder 
without foregoing his right to not incriminate himself.”123  There-
fore, because the defendant maintained his innocence throughout 
trial, any consideration of his silence as insinuating a “lack of re-
morse” at sentencing was a violation of his right to remain silent.124 
The majority opinion in Brake built on precedent established by 
an earlier Nevada case, Brown v. State.125  In Brown, the defendant 
was charged with sexually assaulting a young girl,126 though 
throughout trial, he denied committing the crime.127  The court held 
that when a defendant proclaims innocence throughout trial, he can-
not be expected to show remorse at sentencing (if he is later con-
victed) without compromising his right against forced self-
  
that “it would be irrational or disingenuous to expect or require one who maintains 
his innocence to express contrition or remorse”). 
118. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 738–39; see also Brake, 939 P.2d at 1033–34 (Shear-
ing, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
119. Brake, 939 P.2d at 1030. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 1033. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. 934 P.2d 235 (Nev. 1997). 
126. Id. at 236. 
127. Id. at 240. 
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incrimination.128  Upon this foundation, the Brake court expanded 
the protection for those maintaining innocence during trial to include 
those who admit to committing the underlying act of the charged 
crime but provide some defense or legal justification for their ac-
tions.129  Practically, the Brake court declined the opportunity to dif-
ferentiate between defendants maintaining their absolute innocence 
as to the charged crime and those defendants maintaining their inno-
cence as to the charged crime because of an affirmative defense or 
legal justification.130  Under the Brake rationale, both classes of de-
fendant would be afforded identical self-incrimination protection; 
specifically, each would be free to remain silent at sentencing with-
out being subjected to the inference that he lacks remorse for his 
convicted crime.131 
Dissenting in Brake, Chief Justice Shearing rejected the major-
ity’s reliance on Brown.132  Chief Justice Shearing advocated that 
Brown was different than Brake because the defendant denied any 
involvement in the charged crime in Brown.133  Because the Brake 
defendant admitted the act underlying the crime—killing the vic-
tim—Chief Justice Shearing disagreed that by speaking to show re-
morse at sentencing, the defendant risked any self-incrimination.134  
Despite the apparent conflict with the precedent established in 
  
128. Id. at 245–46.  Burgess adopted this same rationale.  943 A.2d 727, 738 
(N.H. 2008) (stating that the holding is “limited to situations where a defendant 
maintains his innocence throughout the criminal process and risks incriminating 
himself if he expresses remorse at sentencing”). 
129. Brake, 939 P.2d at 1033. 
130. Id. 
131. Although Justice Scalia disagrees with the idea that trial and sentencing 
phases should be treated similarly with regard to Fifth Amendment protection, 
even he agrees that under the Mitchell holding that a trial and sentencing together 
form the “criminal case” noted in the Fifth Amendment, “there is no logical basis 
for drawing . . . a line within the sentencing phase.”  Mitchell v. United States, 526 
U.S. 314, 327, 340 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Brake is in line with this reason-
ing and logic, while Burgess seems to depart. 
132. Brake, 939 P.2d at 1033–34 (Shearing, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1034. 
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Mitchell, the Burgess court elected to align its decision with Chief 
Justice Shearing’s dissent.135 
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE BURGESS LIMITATION 
Using a Brake-like scenario as an example, assume that a defen-
dant is charged with second-degree murder136 for killing his neigh-
bor after a disagreement over a poker game.  At trial, the State pre-
sents a portrayal of the events, stating that the two men began argu-
ing when the defendant lost all of his money during the game and 
accused the other of cheating.  Fuming, the defendant stormed home.  
Still stewing over his lost money, he decided to show his friend that 
he will not tolerate being taken advantage of.  He returned to the site 
of the game, confronted his cheating friend, and demanded his 
money back.  When his friend refused, the defendant pulled out a 
gun from inside of his jacket and shot his friend dead.  The defense 
paints a very different portrayal of the events.  The defendant con-
tends that he returned to the site of the game to get his money back, 
as he felt he had been cheated.  When confronted, the friend became 
defensive, and started to yell.  As his anger escalated, the friend be-
gan shoving the defendant.  When the defendant again accused his 
friend of stealing his money, the friend grabbed a nearby baseball bat 
and took a swing at the defendant’s head.  Reaching for the regis-
tered gun that he always carried in his jacket, the defendant dodged 
his friend’s attack.  Backing him against the wall, the friend cocked 
the bat back, and began to take a would-be deadly blow at the defen-
dant’s head.  Without any other option, the defendant raised his gun 
and fired, shooting his friend dead.  At trial, the defendant testifies 
that he did not return to the site of the game with the knowledge that 
he would likely kill his friend; rather, he maintains that he killed his 
friend in self-defense.  Despite evidence supporting the defendant’s 
defense, the jury finds him guilty of second-degree murder. 
  
135. State v. Burgess, 943 A.2d 727, 739 (N.H. 2008). 
136. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b (2007). 
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A.  Burgess Is Inconsistent with the Purposes of Sentencing 
Now, the defendant is sitting in front of a sentencing judge.  
When asked how he feels about the incident and what happened to 
his friend, the defendant opts to remain silent.  Applying the New 
Hampshire exception to the general Mitchell rule, because the defen-
dant, in claiming self-defense, still admitted to the act underlying the 
charged crime—killing his friend—the judge is free to infer from the 
defendant’s silence that he is unremorseful and to punish him more 
severely as a result. 
In State v. Wentworth, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated 
that “[t]he real purpose of all sentencing is to reduce crime.”137  This 
purpose is promoted by rehabilitating the defendant so he will not 
offend again and by punishing him in the hope that he and others 
will be deterred from repeating his crime. 138  Bearing these purposes 
in mind, it is unclear how Burgess-mandated remorse furthers any of 
the stated goals of sentencing. 
Deterrence is defined as “[t]he act or process of discouraging 
certain behavior, particularly by fear.”139  Considering a defendant 
convicted of second-degree murder who has maintained his inno-
cence throughout trial by way of self-defense, it is unclear how the 
goal of deterrence is furthered by punishing a defendant more se-
verely for refusing to express remorse for the underlying act of tak-
ing another’s life.  If the defendant truly killed in self-defense, the 
length of his imposed sentence is immaterial.  Because the act of 
killing another is a reaction rather than an intention, there is no be-
havior that the punishment must deter. 
A second purpose of punishment is rehabilitation, which refers to 
“[t]he process of seeking to improve a criminal’s character and out-
look so that he or she can function in society without committing 
other crimes.”140  Some courts reason that those defendants who re-
main silent at a sentencing hearing lack remorse and thus have a de-
  
137. 395 A.2d 858, 864 (N.H. 1978). 
138. Id. 
139. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 481 (8th ed. 2004). 
140. Id. at 1311. 
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creased potential for rehabilitation.141  However, in instances where 
a defendant maintains his innocence by way of legal justification or 
defense, it is unclear how any showing of remorse for committing 
the act underlying the crime without the requisite intent relates to a 
defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation.  Rather, in such a case, the 
defendant maintains that he was placed in a situation where he felt 
that he needed to kill his attacker in order to preserve his own life, 
and that he would not intentionally harm or kill another outside of 
this narrow circumstance.  Under the goal of rehabilitation, it is not 
the commission of the act that needs to be rehabilitated; it is the in-
tention to commit the act that must be remedied.  Without intent, 
there is no criminal outlook or character that needs to be reformed.  
Regardless of the sentence of a defendant who maintains that he 
killed in self-defense, if he is later placed in a similar life-or-death 
situation, he, just as most others, would kill again to save his own 
life.  Showing remorse for such a reaction is not suggestive of any 
rehabilitative capacity as there is no need for such a defendant to be 
rehabilitated. 
Outside of judicial efforts to reduce crime, courts also impose 
punishments as a form of retribution, which centers on the idea of an 
“eye for an eye” and that a punishment should fit the severity of a 
crime.142  However, even proceeding from a retributivist perspective, 
consideration of the defendant’s remorse in sentencing is incorrect.  
“Retributivist theory is forward looking and primarily concerned 
with assigning punishments that are in proportion to the severity of 
the offense.  Feelings of remorse do not assist in determining the 
blameworthiness of a defendant, nor do they repair the harm 
caused.”143  A simple showing of remorse does not erase the harm 
and effect of the defendant’s actions.  If a criminal sentence is to 
correlate with the defendant’s “blameworthiness” for the crime, his 
  
141. State v. Burgess, 943 A.2d 727, 733; see also United States v. Johnson, 903 
F.2d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 1990). 
142. Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 131, 132 
(2006) (discussing the irrelevancy of remorse in the determination of criminal 
sentencing). 
143. Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). 
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after-the-fact feeling about his actions should not be considered 
when determining his punishment.144 
B.  Burgess Requires Defendants to Possess Some Degree of Lin-
guistic Artfulness 
At its core, Burgess requires lay defendants to express moral re-
morse for committing the acts underlying a crime without expressing 
legal remorse for committing the actual crime itself.145  In addition to 
drawing such a delicate distinction, defendants must also sufficiently 
articulate emotion that the judge will consider remorseful but cannot 
express the remorse in such a way that will be incriminating.  They 
must show moral remorse while still maintaining their legal inno-
cence.146 
Given the inherent subtleties in such a distinction, Burgess begs 
the question: should an unsophisticated defendant be put in a posi-
tion where he runs the risk of self-incrimination if he misspeaks and 
expresses the wrong remorse?  Ideally, judges would like a defen-
dant to express remorse for committing a crime during sentencing.  
Defendants are all too aware of this expectation.  Under Burgess, a 
defendant must possess the understanding that he cannot be forced or 
encouraged to express this type of legal remorse and that he cannot 
be punished for remaining silent.147  Rather, the defendant must rec-
ognize and separate the criminal element of intent and only express 
moral remorse for doing something “bad,” even though he claims 
that he did not have the requisite intent to be held liable. 
Some may argue that defendants typically are thoroughly pre-
pared for sentencing and will be able to exhibit scripted moral re-
morse as instructed by their attorneys.  Even proceeding under the 
assumption that every attorney will clearly delineate the difference 
between legal and moral remorse for his client and prepare the client 
to express only moral remorse, such canned and scripted showings 
of remorse may be more detrimental than helpful.  Specifically, in 
order to avoid a harsher sentence, a defendant may express verbatim 
  
144. Id. 
145. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 738. 
146. Id. at 738–39. 
147. Id. at 734. 
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moral remorse as instructed by his attorney.  However, it seems un-
likely that such a scripted recantation of remorse would be believ-
able to a judge.  Given the breadth of discretion a judge has in sen-
tencing a defendant,148 it is possible that a clearly insincere defen-
dant who expresses fake moral remorse would lead a judge to render 
a harsher sentence than he would have had the defendant simply re-
mained silent.  Forcing defendants to appear morally apologetic will 
undoubtedly encourage insincere and unbelievable expressions of 
moral remorse. 
Given the subtle nature of the distinction between moral and le-
gal remorse, it seems unnecessary for courts to place defendants in a 
situation where they could easily incriminate themselves by simply 
misspeaking when there are other recognized means to evaluate a 
defendant’s remorse for his convicted crime.  In State v. Shreves, the 
Montana Supreme Court recognized several other ways for a sen-
tencing judge to determine a defendant’s remorse without risking a 
Fifth Amendment violation.149  Specifically, the court stated that 
sentencing judges could look to a defendant’s pretrial and trial 
statements, the manner of the commission of the offense as demon-
strated by presented evidence, and any other evidence properly ad-
mitted at the sentencing hearing.150 
C.  The Burgess Rule Is Inconsistent and Potentially Difficult to Ap-
ply 
[W]here a defendant admits to committing the acts underly-
ing the charged crime, but disputes whether he had the requi-
site mental state for the crime, or offers a legal justification 
for committing those acts, the defendant’s silence at sentenc-
ing might, in certain instances, legitimately be considered as 
a lack of remorse.151 
According to Burgess, there are instances where a defendant has 
admitted to the acts underlying a crime, that it might—in certain cir-
  
148. Id. at 733; see also State v. Lambert, 787 A.2d 175, 176 (N.H. 2001). 
149. 60 P.3d 991, 996 (Mont. 2002). 
150. Id. 
151. Burgess, 943 A.2d at 738 (emphasis added) (citing Brake v. State, 939 P.2d 
1029, 1034 (1997)). 
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cumstances—be permissible for the judge to read into the defen-
dant’s silence at sentencing to determine his lack of remorse.152  
Based on the court’s own language, this inapplicability of the Fifth 
Amendment only occurs sometimes.153  However, this rule is prob-
lematic as it begs a major question: when?  Burgess provides little 
guidance as to when a defendant’s right against self-incrimination 
will not be recognized.  The court stated that when a defendant 
claims self-defense, his silence may be used to infer his lack of re-
morse for the underlying act of killing another human being.154  Fur-
ther, the court held that Burgess should have shown remorse for “en-
dangering the safety of court personnel,” even though he claimed to 
have bolted away from the attending officers as a result of his feeling 
that they were closing in on him too quickly.155  Outside of these two 
narrow examples, Burgess provides little guidance for defendants as 
to when their silence may be legitimately inferred as a lack of re-
morse at sentencing.  Specifically, the court does not even imple-
ment a firm rule that whenever a defendant has admitted to the acts 
underlying a crime, he will be expected to show remorse at sentenc-
ing.  Rather the court states that this rule will only apply in “certain 
instances.”156 
The United States Supreme Court has been clear that the Fifth 
Amendment protects defendants from being compelled to incrimi-
nate themselves at trial.157  Further, the Court has been clear that 
these same protections must be afforded to defendants during sen-
tencing.158  Given the unpredictability of Burgess, it seems that sub-
jecting defendants to such an undefined and ambiguous limitation on 
the Fifth Amendment would do nothing more than compel them to 
  
152. Id. 
153. Such a scenario does not even occur every time the defendant has admitted to 
the acts underlying the charged crime.  See id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 739. 
156. Id. at 738. 
157. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999) (“As the Court stated in 
Estelle: ‘Any effort by the State to compel [the defendant] to testify against his 
will at the sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981))); Grif-
fin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614–15 (1965). 
158. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 326. 
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speak,159 as they would always be unsure whether their case was one 
of the chosen circumstances where drawing negative inferences from 
silence would be permissible.160 
1.  Unanswered Questions 
The most significant question left open by Burgess is when will 
the limitation on the Fifth Amendment apply?  Based on the case, it 
is inferable that the court can allow negative inferences to be drawn 
from a defendant’s silence at sentencing in order to determine a lack 
of remorse when the defendant has admitted to the acts underlying 
the charged crime.  However, even this is not absolute.  The court is 
vague in its presentation of its limitation and gives little guidance as 
to how it will be enforced in the future. 
a.  How Will Courts Handle a Defendant Who Presents Multiple 
Defenses? 
Assume hypothetically that a defendant is charged with first-
degree assault.161  He pleads not guilty.  There is no “smoking gun” 
linking the defendant to the crime.  Also, there is another man who 
could have committed the act.  At trial, the defendant maintains his 
innocence as to the charged crime.  However, the defendant also 
states that he has a history of sleepwalking.  In the alternative, he 
states that even if he committed the crime, he did so while sleep-
walking and therefore should not be held culpable.162  Despite his 
  
159. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (“The privilege against 
self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate 
himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination.” (empha-
sis added)). 
160. See Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 557–58 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that 
defendant must be warned that statements can be used against him in order for the 
privilege against self-incrimination not be violated at sentencing); United States v. 
Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 430–32 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that in order for pretrial 
statements to be used against the defendant at sentencing, the defendant must be 
put on notice that the statements could be used against him). 
161. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:1 (2007). 
162. United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 n.11 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing that sleepwalking is a valid defense to crimes of specific intent).  
Massachusetts, Delaware, Florida, Arizona, and Ohio, as well as Canada, Austra-
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contentions, the jury convicts the defendant of first-degree assault.  
As the defendant prepares for trial, he faces several questions.  
Mainly, which defense will trump the other?  Will the court consider 
that he first maintained absolute innocence and affirm the extension 
of Fifth Amendment protections into his sentencing?  Alternatively, 
will the court look at his sleepwalking defense, determine that, he is 
admitting to the acts underlying the assault, and enforce the Burgess 
limitation, thus allowing the sentencing judge to infer a lack of re-
morse from his silence if he chooses not to speak?  Still, the over-
arching question still exists: How will the defendant know if the 
Burgess limitation applies to this sentencing hearing?  Without very 
explicit guidance as to when the court is going to consider the Fifth 
Amendment waived at sentencing, a defendant may be compelled to 
express remorse at sentencing out of the fear that if he does not, the 
sentencing judge may be allowed to infer that he is not remorseful 
and punish him accordingly. 
b.  How Will the Burgess Limitation Apply If the Defendant 
Chooses Not to Testify During His Trial? 
The situations presented in both Burgess and Brake are the result 
of richly developed records.  In each case, the defendant chose to 
testify on his own behalf and clearly explained the circumstances 
surrounding the alleged crime and his own involvement in the act.  
In assessing the workings of the Burgess limitation, it is unclear how 
the rule would be enforced, or whether it would be enforced at all, if 
the defendant chose not to testify during his trial.  Specifically, will 
Burgess be relevant where the defendant opts not to testify, but his 
attorney, through evidence and witness testimony, presents that the 
defendant, in committing the actions underlying the charged crime, 
acted in self-defense? 
  
lia, and the United Kingdom have all recognized sleepwalking as a valid defense.  
E.g., State v. Cabrera, 891 A.2d 1066, 1072 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005).  Aside from 
sleepwalking, alcoholism (en bloc blackouts) and intoxication defenses may also 
be used by a defendant.  E.g., Smith v. State, 622 S.E.2d 413, 414–15 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
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Taking the facts of the first hypothetical,163 assume that the de-
fendant does not testify.  Rather, another poker player testifies that 
he saw victim lunge toward the defendant and only when the victim 
tried to strike the defendant with the baseball bat did the defendant 
reach for his gun and shoot the victim.  In light of this testimony, the 
defendant’s attorney contends, on his client’s behalf, that the defen-
dant killed the victim in self-defense. 
Applying the Burgess limitation to this hypothetical, there is no 
question that, through his attorney’s words, the defendant has admit-
ted to the acts underlying the charged crime, specifically that he 
killed his friend.  Burgess held that in Brake-like scenarios involving 
self-defense, it is permissible for a judge to infer a lack of remorse 
from a defendant’s silence when determining his sentence.  How-
ever, Burgess is unclear as to whether this limitation on the Fifth 
Amendment hinges on the defendant’s own assertion of self-defense 
during trial or whether self-defense may be presented through his 
attorney. 
As discussed above, these vagaries are problematic because they 
leave defendants in positions of uncertainty.  Without a clear de-
lineation as when the Burgess limitation applies, defendants will be 
left to wonder when their silence can be used against them and when 
it cannot.  There will be instances where the defendant’s fear that his 
silence can be used against him will compel him to express remorse 
at sentencing.  This expression of remorse is especially problematic 
when the defendant has not testified at trial, because it will necessar-
ily imply his guilt for conduct that he did not admit to committing at 
trial.164  This cannot be the case.  The case law is clear: a defendant 
cannot be compelled during a criminal proceeding to testify against 
himself.165  Accordingly, since the Burgess limitation is so undefined 
that it may work to compel speech that may otherwise not be made, 
it conflicts with the very spirit of the Fifth Amendment. 
  
163. See supra Part IV. 
164. If the defendant is later granted a new trial, his statements from sentencing 
could be used against him.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a).  Such a statement 
would not exist had the defendant not been forced to express remorse at sentenc-
ing. 
165. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327 (1999). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps one of the most vocal critics against the extension of the 
Fifth Amendment into sentencing is Justice Scalia.166  Still, regard-
less of his criticisms of the Mitchell majority, he does concede that if 
one accepts the theory that a “criminal case” includes both the trial 
and sentencing, “there is no logical basis for drawing such a line 
within the sentencing phase” as to when the Fifth Amendment will 
apply and when it will not.167  This is precisely what Burgess at-
tempts to do.  Specifically, under Burgess, the privilege against self-
incrimination will apply only to a defendant who maintains his inno-
cence as to the charged crime but not to the defendant who chooses 
to maintain his innocence through a legal justification or defense.  
However, even the limitation that the privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply when the defendant relies on a legal 
justification or defense is not absolute; the limitation only exists in 
“certain instances.”168  Accordingly, under Burgess, a defendant will 
walk into sentencing unsure as to whether negative inferences from 
his silence will be permissible or whether he is safe to exercise his 
constitutional rights.  The unworkability of such a limitation high-
lights Justice Scalia’s words; it does not make sense to draw lines 
within sentencing as to when the privilege will and will not apply.  
Because a defendant’s lack of remorse can be “gleaned, without 
more, from the manner of the commission of the offense as demon-
strated by the evidence at trial or from other competent evidence 
properly admitted at the sentencing hearing,” 169 it is illogical to cre-
ate intricate rules that attempt to define specific instances where the 
privilege need not apply.  Further, given that the common law is 
clear that the privilege against self-incrimination applies during both 
the trial and sentencing, and that the privilege is absolute, limitations 
  
166. In his dissent in Mitchell, Justice Scalia completely rejects the applicability 
of the Fifth Amendment in the realm of sentencing, arguing that not prohibiting 
judges from drawing negative inferences from a defendant’s silence at sentencing 
“runs exactly counter to normal evidentiary inferences.”  Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
167. Id. at 340. 
168. State v. Burgess, 943 A.2d 727, 738 (N.H. 2008). 
169. State v. Shreves, 60 P.3d 991, 996 (Mont. 2002). 
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such as the one created in Burgess are misplaced.170  Only when the 
Court opts to alter its definition of a criminal case may the privilege 
against self-incrimination and Burgess-like limitations coexist. 
  
170. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 453 (2000) (reiterating that 
“the Fifth Amendment’s bar on compelled self-incrimination is absolute”). 
